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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
‘…transfer pricing continues to be, and will remain, the most important 
international tax issue facing MNEs.’1 
 
The term ‘transfer pricing’ is used to describe arrangements involving 
the transfer of goods or services, at an artificial price, in order to transfer 
income or expenses from one enterprise to an associated enterprise in a 
different tax jurisdiction. 2  This results in the income derived at for each 
enterprise being disproportionate to their relative economic contributions, and 
thus impacting the relevant tax jurisdictions’ fair share of tax.3  Tax authorities 
are therefore focusing their attention on transfer pricing rules and practices to 
ensure the correct attribution of income and expenses of related-party 
transactions.4 
 
Another key issue, closely related to transfer pricing, is that of double 
taxation.  Multinational enterprises, engaging in cross-border transactions, 
are at risk of having a single source of income taxed in two jurisdictions as a 
result of an incorrect application of transfer pricing rules.5 
 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate South Africa’s approach to 
transfer pricing, as well as compare it to the approaches as adopted by 
selected countries, namely Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada, with 
the aim of identifying the areas that South Africa could learn from practices in 
foreign jurisdictions. 
 
                                               
1
  Ernst & Young ‘2005-2006 Global Transfer Pricing Surveys – Tax Authority Interviews:  
Perspectives, Interpretations and Regulatory Changes’ at 5. Available at 
http://www.ey.com/Global/download.nsf/International/Tax_-
_Global_Transfer_Pricing_Survey_Part_3/$file/EY_GlobalTPSurvey3_Sep2006.pdf  
[Accessed 18 January 2007]. 
2
  Keith Huxham and Phillip Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 24ed (2005) 346. 
3
  Magola Tsibogo Makola Transfer Pricing in South Africa (2003) 1. 
4
  Dale Clinton Cridlan Transfer pricing in South Africa: a comparative examination of the 
  legislative, administrative and judicial approaches to combat this form of tax avoidance  
  (2001) 1. 
5





Specific issues dealt with include acceptable transfer pricing methods 
for determining an arm’s length price, documentation requirements and non-
compliance penalties, the use of Advance Pricing Agreements (“APA”), and 
the effects of e-commerce in applying the arm’s length principle. 
 
The first issue relates to the criteria for the selection of the most 
suitable method in ensuring an arm’s length outcome.  Because the South 
African market is considered to be lacking in comparables, compliance with 
the arm’s length principle will be determined by evaluation of the facts and 
circumstances of each case.6 
 
The second issue looks at the transfer pricing policy documentation 
required to be prepared, the benefits of preparing such documentation, and 
the imposition of penalties on taxpayers failing to do so.  The lack of statutory 
documentation requirements and specific penalty provisions in the South 
African legislation is also addressed. 
 
The third issue evaluates the use of APAs in resolving transfer pricing 
disputes.  This technique is adopted by Australia, the United Kingdom and 
Canada, and therefore an assessment is made, taking into account both 
advantages and disadvantages of the technique, to determine whether it 
would be beneficial to South Africa to be able to agree in advance to transfer 
pricing methods to be applied to transactions with connected parties, thus 
reducing the potential for expensive and time consuming disputes with the 
South African Revenue Service (“SARS”).7 
 
The fourth and final issue explores the challenges facing tax 
jurisdictions as a result of an increase in electronic trade.  The relevance of 
the arm’s length principle is assessed and recommendations for South Africa 
are made.  
                                               
6
  Cridlan op cit note 4 at 3. 
7





CHAPTER 2: TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
 
Before the introduction in South Africa of the revised section 31 of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (“the Act”), as amended, which took effect from 
19 July 1995, transfer pricing was regulated by the compliance with article 9 
of the OECD Model Tax Convention Treaty or its equivalent.  Profits were 
either adjusted in terms of the general deduction formula if expenditure was 
grossly excessive, or in terms of section 103(1) of the Act for general anti-
avoidance.  Where property was disposed of for a consideration not 
constituting an arm’s length amount, the Commissioner could deem it to be a 
donation in terms of section 58 of the Act, resulting in the deemed donation 
being subject to donations tax at a rate of 20%.8  Prior to the easing of 
exchange controls, the shifting of profits from South Africa to associated 
companies in lower tax jurisdictions could have been prevented by the 
restrictions imposed by exchange controls.9 
 
In its First Interim Report, the Commission of Inquiry into Certain 
Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa (“The Katz Commission”) 
articulated the fact that there was a lack of protection against the abuse of 
transfer prices.10  The Katz Commission noted that the South African tax 
system needed legislative teeth with which to protect itself against excessive 
price manipulation between related parties.11  The Second Interim Report 
listed the following four approaches, as developed by the worlds’ tax 
systems, from which the South African Legislative had a choice to implement 
in order to counteract transfer pricing: 
 
                                               
8
  Lynette Olivier and Michael Honiball International Tax: A South African Perspective 3ed 
(2005) 400. 
9
  Keith Huxham and Phillip Haupt cited in Olivier and Honiball (note 8) at 400-401. 
10
 Makola op cit note 3 at 3. 
11
  Second Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax 





a) the most stringent approach has legislative teeth backed up with 
formal, detailed and binding regulations as to what constitutes 
acceptable pricing, exemplified by the United States; 
 
b) a second approach, also with legislative teeth, does not have formal 
regulations, but does have detailed guidelines as to acceptable 
pricing, such as the German model; 
 
c) the third approach also has anti-transfer pricing legislation, but relies 
on arm’s length concepts to dictate acceptable pricing practices, as in 
the United Kingdom and other countries which rely strongly on OECD 
guidelines; and 
 
d) a fourth approach which does not have any specific transfer pricing 
legislation and relies on normal, general anti-avoidance provisions and 
tax law to combat transfer pricing, such as in the Netherlands. 
 
The Katz Commission recommended that the third approach, which relied on 
arm’s length concepts as contained in the OECD guidelines, be implemented 
in South Africa.12 
 
The legislation referred to above, to regulate transfer pricing, may still 
be used by SARS, but the revised section 31 allows SARS to adjust non-
arm’s length transfer prices for a much broader range of goods or services.  
Take for example the general deduction formula.  In the case of ITC 569 13 
SATC 447, the courts held that expenditure that is grossly excessive is not 
deductible.  However, there are no specific guidelines to help identify grossly 
excessive expenditure other than in the case of Tobacco Father v COT 17 
SATC 39513 in which it was held that the open market price could not be 
                                               
12
 Second Interim Report op cit note 11 para 14.6.26 and 14.6.27.  
13





referred to by the court in certain circumstances.  It therefore follows that the 
general deduction formula is limited when used to adjust transfer prices.14 
 
2.2 TRANSFER PRICING DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
 
Section 1 and section 31(1) of the Act contain the following definitions 
applicable to transfer pricing: 
 
Goods 
Goods are defined to include any incorporeal moveable thing, fixed property 
and any real right in such thing or fixed property. 
 
Services 
Services are broadly defined to include anything done or to be done, plus the 
following: 
• the granting, assignment, cession or surrender of any right, benefit or 
privilege; 
• the making available of any facility or advantage; 
• the granting of financial assistance, including a loan, advance or debt, 
and the provision of any security or guarantee 
• the performance of any works; 
• an agreement of insurance; and 
• the conferring of rights to incorporeal property. 
 
International agreement 
Section 31(1) defines the entering into of a transaction, operation or scheme 
between the following four groups of parties to be an international 
agreement: 
a) a resident and any other person who is not a resident 
b) a person who is not a resident and any other person who is not a 
resident for the supply of goods or services to or by a permanent 
establishment of either of such persons within South Africa 
                                               
14





c) a person who is a resident and any other person who is a resident for 
the supply of goods or services to or by a permanent establishment of 
either of such persons outside South Africa 
d) two residents where either of such persons is not subject to tax in 




Section 1 defines ‘permanent establishment’ with reference to the definition 
contained in article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention Treaty.  The term 
means ‘a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise 
is wholly or partly carried on’ and the business profits are taxable where the 
fixed place of business is based. 
 
Connected person 
Section 1 widely defines the term ‘connected person’ in relation to: 
• natural persons; 
• trusts; 
• partnerships; 
• companies; and  
• close corporations 
Section 31(2) is only applicable if the acquirer and the supplier of goods or 
services are connected persons in relation to one another.15 
 
SARS’ Practice Note No 716 contains the following two important 
definitions that cannot be found in the Act: 
 
Controlled transaction  
SARS’ Practice Note No 7 para 1.2.1 defines a ‘controlled transaction’ as a 
transaction in terms of which the ownership or control relationship is able to 
influence the transfer price set.  In relation to s 31 a controlled transaction will 
be any transaction between connected persons, as defined in s 1 of the Act.  
                                               
15
  Olivier and Honiball op cit note 8 at 404. 
16
  South African Revenue Services (SARS’) Practice Note No 7 – Section 31 of the Income 
Tax Act 1962: Determination of Taxable Income of Certain Persons from International 







SARS’ Practice Note No 7 para 1.2.2 defines an ‘uncontrolled transaction’ as 
a transaction which is concluded at arm’s length between enterprises that are 
not connected persons in relation to each other.  This could, for example, 
include transactions at arm’s length between a member of a multinational 
and an unconnected person.  Uncontrolled transactions form the benchmark 
against which a multinational’s transfer pricing is appraised in determining 
whether its prices are arm’s length.   
 
2.3  THE ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE 
 
Transfer pricing can deprive governments of their fair share of taxes 
from global corporations and expose multinationals to possible double 
taxation.  No country – poor, emerging or wealthy – wants its tax base 
to suffer because of transfer pricing.  The arm’s length principle can 
help.17 
  
In order to avoid such problems as double taxation, South Africa has 
adopted the arm’s length principle (“ALP”) on which the current OECD 
international guidelines are based.  More specifically, the ALP can be found 
in para 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention Treaty used for 
bilateral treaties,18 which reads as follow: 
 
[When] conditions are made or imposed between …two [associated] 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ from 
those which would have been made between independent enterprises, 
then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to 
one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so 
accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly.19 
 
                                               
17
  John Neighbour ‘Transfer pricing: Keeping it at arm’s length.’ Available at 
http://oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/670/Transfer_pricing:_Keeping_it_at_arms_le
ngth.html [Accessed 21 December 2006]. 
18
  Ibid. 
19





Even though South Africa is not a member of the OECD, the Practice 
Note is based on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines20 and these 
guidelines should be followed if no specific guidance is given in the Practice 
Note or s 31.21 
 
The SARS’ Practice Note No 7 para 7.3 states that: 
… the problem to be resolved is how a multinational should determine 
what price would have arisen if transactions between its members 
were subject to market forces.  The solution advanced by the arm’s 
length principle is that a comparable transaction between independent 
parties (an uncontrolled transaction) should be used as a benchmark 
against which to appraise the multinational’s prices (the controlled 
transaction).  Any difference between the two transactions can then be 
identified and adjusted.  An arm’s length price that will reflect the 
economic contributions made by the parties to the transaction can be 
determined for the controlled transaction. 
 
The ALP provides MNEs and the relevant tax jurisdictions with a 
single international standard for transactions entered into between them that 
give the various tax jurisdictions a fair portion of the tax base of the MNEs.22 
Using an internationally accepted method to split profits between connected 
enterprises is also beneficial when it comes to dealing with difficult countries 
that try to enforce their own transfer pricing rules.23 
 
Section 31(2) is the only section in the Act dealing with the definition of 
an arm’s length price.  It also does not provide any guidelines in terms of how 
to objectively determine an arm’s length price.  The SARS’ Practice Note No 
7 contains various different international methods for determining an arm’s 
                                               
20
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration (1995). 
21
  SARS Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
22
  Neighbour op cit note 17. 
23





length price, but because SARS’ Practice Notes and Interpretation Notes do 
not normally constitute law (ITC 1675 62 SATC 219), the Commissioner will 
have to look at the facts of each case individually to determine whether an 
arm’s length transfer price has been arrived at,24 taking into consideration 
that, according to the Practice Note, an arm’s length price does not 
necessarily constitute a single price, but a range of prices. 
 
                                               
24









Because the Act does not stipulate any methodology to be used in order 
to determine an arm’s length price, SARS’ Practice Note No 7 allows the 
taxpayer to use the standard transfer pricing methods accepted by the OECD 
Guidelines: 
• the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method); 
• the resale price method (RP method); 
• the cost plus method (CP method); 
• the transactional net margin method (TNMM); and 
• the profit split method 25 
 
The SARS’ Practice Note No 7 states that in order to select the most 
suitable method, which should result in the maximum level of comparability 
and the least amount of adjustments, the facts of each case will need to be 
examined taking into account the availability of reliable data.26  Although the 
Practice Note does not require a hierarchy of transfer pricing methods to be 
followed, it does mention that the traditional transaction methods are 
preferred.27  The CUP method is then preferred over the other two traditional 
transaction methods, ‘as it looks to the product or service transferred and is 
relatively insensitive to the specific functions which are performed by the 
entities being compared.’ 28 
 
3.2  INDEPENDENCE AND COMPARABILITY 
 
In defining the ALP, the OECD Guidelines state the following: 
 
                                               
25
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.1.1 and 9.2.2. 
26
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.1.2 and 9.3.2. 
27
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.3.1 and 9.3.4. 
28






Application of the arm’s length principle is generally based on a 
comparison of the conditions in a controlled transaction with the 
conditions in transactions between “independent” enterprises.  In order 
for such comparisons to be useful, the economically relevant 
characteristics of the situations being compared must be sufficiently 
“comparable”. 29 
 
In order to apply the ALP, it is essential that the situations under 
review are comparable.30  To meet the requirement of comparability, any 
differences that may arise between the situations being compared cannot be 
such that the circumstance being examined in the method is materially 
affected, and there is no possibility of a reliable adjustment being made.31  
Adjustments to minor differences though should be avoided as applying 
arm’s length methods always involve elements of judgement.32  There are 
many factors that can affect the assessment of comparability, such as the 
features of goods and services, the importance of functions performed, the 
economic circumstances, and the business strategies.33 
 
Companies are required to be independent as this ensures that 
transactions take place at arm’s length.  Transactions between related 
parties tend to deviate from market conditions by the imposition of conditions 
by one of the parties involved.34 
 
In certain situations it is not possible for both the requirements of 
independence and comparability to be applicable.  It is then up to the tax 
authorities to decide which criteria to adhere to.  In section 1.70 of the OECD 
                                               
29
  OECD ‘Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ para 1.15 cited in Paul Balkus et al ‘Using 
comparables with significant intercompany sales.’ Available at 
http://www.kpmgtaxwatch.com/pub/intl/TransferPricingGuide_2005_(7thEdition).pdf  
[Accessed 3 January 2007]. 
30
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 8.1.1. 
31
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 8.1.2. 
32
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 8.1.3.   
33
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 8.1.6. 
34





Guidelines, it mentions that suitable comparables are not necessarily 
identical, yet it also mentions that information on controlled companies could 
be helpful ‘in understanding the transaction under review or as a pointer to 
further investigation’.35 
 
3.3 ACCEPTABLE METHODS FOR DETERMINING AN 
ARM’S LENGTH PRICE 
 
The OECD Guidelines classify the transfer pricing methods under two 
types of methods, namely: 
 
• Traditional transaction methods, which are reliant on the information 
relating to the prices at which uncontrolled comparable transactions 
between unconnected parties would take place.  Traditional 
transaction methods include the CUP, RP and CP methods. 
 
• Transactional profit methods, which are reliant on the information 
relating to either the amount of profit generated by one party in 
comparison to an uncontrolled transaction, or to the division of the 
total profits brought in by both parties to the transaction.  Transactional 
profit methods include the TNMM and the profit split method.36 
 
3.3.1 Traditional Transaction Methods 
 
Comparable Uncontrolled Price method 
The Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method is used to make a 
comparison between the prices charged for goods or services in a 
transaction that is controlled and the prices charged for comparable goods or 
services in a transaction that is uncontrolled, where the circumstances are 
                                               
35
  Balkus op cit note 29. 
36





also comparable.37  In practice, however, the comparability of goods or 
services is made difficult due to small changes in trading circumstances that 
can significantly impact the price.38 
 
Should differences exist between the two transactions, it may be 
possible to make adjustments to enable comparisons to be made.39 
Examples of adjustments that are often allowed include differences in the 
terms of a transaction (for example, credit terms, sell FOB to a connected 
person and at CIF to an independent party), differences in the volumes 
transferred and differences in the timing of the transaction.40  However, if the 
following differences exist, it may not always be possible to make any 
adjustments: differences in the quality of the products, differences in the 
geographic markets, differences in the market levels and differences in the 
amount and type of intangible property involved.41 
 
There are two types of comparable transactions, namely, external 
comparables and internal comparables.  An external comparable transaction 
involves the transference of similar goods or services under similar 
circumstances between two unrelated enterprises.  An internal comparable 
transaction, on the other hand, involves the transference of similar goods and 
services under similar circumstances with one of the parties involved being 
the taxpayer and the other an unrelated enterprise.42 
 
The Practice Note states that the CUP method should be used over 
other methods if comparable uncontrolled transactions can be obtained.43 
Although controlled and uncontrolled transactions are seldom ever truly 
                                               
37
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.4.1. 
38
  Wikipedia the free encyclopedia ‘Transfer pricing.’ Available at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transfer_pricing [Accessed 22 December 2006]; SARS’ Practice 
Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.4.3. 
39
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.4.2. 
40
  PricewaterhouseCoopers cited in Richardson op cit note 5; SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op 
cit note 16 para 9.4.2. 
41
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.4.2. 
42
  Ibid; Wikipedia op cit note 36. 
43





comparable, the guidelines advise that ‘Every effort should be made to adjust 
the data so that it may be used appropriately in a CUP method’.44 
 
The Resale Price method 
The Resale Price (RP) method involves working backwards with 
supply chain transactions.45  The price at which the goods or services are 
sold to an unrelated third party, having originally been purchased from a 
connected enterprise, is reduced by an appropriate gross margin plus any 
adjustments for other related purchase costs (for example, customs duties), 
to arrive at the arm’s length price.  The gross margin covers the reseller’s 
general, selling and administrative expenses and provides for a profit after 
taking into account functions performed, assets used and risks assumed by 
the reseller.46 
The RP method can diagrammatically be represented as follows: 
 
Figure 3.1 
Diagrammatic illustration of the Resale Price method 
47
 
                                               
44
  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines II-3 cited in Richardson op cit note 5 at 32. 
45
  Wikipedia op cit note 38. 
46
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.5.1. 
47
  Taxation Ruling 97/20 Income tax: arm’s length transfer pricing methodologies for 





To determine the resale price margin in the controlled transaction, the 
resale price margin that the same reseller earns on goods or services 
purchased and sold in a comparable uncontrolled transaction may be 
referred to.  The resale price margin can also be obtained by considering one 
used in a sale between two independent parties.48 
 
For the RP method the comparability of the functions performed by the 
connected and the independent entities is more important than that of the 
product comparability.  The reason for this is that differences in products are 
more likely to have an affect on prices than on profit margins.49  The RP 
method is therefore preferred to the CUP method in situations where 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions are comparable in all aspects other 
than the product itself.50 
 
The Cost Plus method 
The Cost Plus (CP) method, which is mostly used for the trade of 
finished goods, is determined by adding an appropriate ‘cost plus mark up’ to 
the costs incurred by the supplier in manufacturing/purchasing the goods or 
services that are provided in a controlled transaction with an associated 
enterprise.51  The mark up includes an appropriate profit, taking into account 
the functions performed, assets used and risks assumed.52 
 
The CP method can diagrammatically be represented as follows: 
                                               
48
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.5.2. 
49
  Ibid. 
50
  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines II-6 cited in Richardson op cit note 5 at 33. 
51
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.6.1; Wikipedia op cit note 38. 
52






  Figure 3.2 




To determine the mark up, reference should be made to the mark up 
earned by the same enterprise in a comparable uncontrolled transaction, 
otherwise the mark up earned by an independent enterprise in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction may be used.  As under the RP method, functional 
comparability is more important than product comparability.54 
 
In practice, the application of this method causes certain problems to 
arise.  Firstly, it is difficult to determine the costs to use as the effectiveness 
of companies varies, resulting in some incurring lower costs than others.  
Secondly, to stay in line with accounting policies the same type of costs need 
to be compared, and therefore appropriate adjustments may need to be 
made.  Thirdly, segregated product data is often required which is not 
normally available in respect of the uncontrolled enterprises that are being 
used as comparisons.55  Finally, there may be times when there is no link 
                                               
53
  Taxation Ruling 97/20 op cit note 47 para 3.32. 
54
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.6.2. 
55





between the cost and the sale price (for example, if competition forces the 
sale of goods that are approaching obsolescence at prices below cost).  The 
facts of each case therefore need to be looked at to determine whether the 
CP method will be applicable.56 
 
3.3.2 Transactional Profit Methods 
 
Transactional Net Margin method 
The Transactional Net Margin method (TNMM) evaluates the taxpayer 
to establish the net profit margin realised from a controlled transaction, 
relative to an appropriate base, such as cost, sales or assets.57  This ratio, 
referred to by SARS as a ‘profit level indicator’, is compared to ‘profit level 
indicators’ of the taxpayer’s comparable uncontrolled dealings or an 
independent enterprise’s uncontrolled dealings.58 
 
The following diagram illustrates the application of the TNMM on the ‘net 
resale price’ basis: 
                                               
56
  OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines II-12 cited in Richardson op cit note 5 at 35. 
57
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.7.1. 
58






  Figure 3.3 




Similarly, the TNMM may be applied on a ‘net cost plus’ basis, 
diagrammatically illustrated as follows: 
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  Figure 3.4 




TNMM is seen as a “unified version” of the RP and CP methods 
because it also makes use of comparable companies to determine an 
appropriate margin to apply.61  Another similarity with the RP and CP 
methods is that the TNMM concentrates on the functions performed by an 
enterprise, but comparing net profit as opposed to gross profit.62 
 
Traditional transaction methods are seen as more reliable than the 
TNMM due to the fact that the TNMM is sensitive to the differences in cost 
structures of comparable enterprises because of the inclusion of operating 
expenses, and the TNMM also requires structural similarity between the 
associated enterprise and the independent enterprise being compared, when 
in fact firms are structurally unique in practice.63 
 
                                               
60
  Ibid. 
61
  Wikipedia op cit note 38. 
62
  SARS’ Practice Note No 7 op cit note 16 para 9.7.2. 
63





Practical problems surrounding the TNMM include the fact that net 
margins can be affected by certain factors that may not have an effect on 
price or gross margins, resulting in the possibility of an unreliable and 
inaccurate arm’s length net margin.64 Application of the TNMM may not be 
possible due to unavailability of information about the taxpayer when the 
arm’s length price is required to be determined, as well as due to 
unavailability of information on the controlled transaction.65  However, reliable 
information on gross margins may be impossible to get hold of and therefore 
in certain cases the TNMM may be the only practical method to apply.66 
 
The Profit Split method 
This method involves taking the combined profit of the related 
enterprises in a controlled transaction and allocating the profit amongst the 
enterprises on a basis that is economically valid and that would have been 
used in an arm’s length agreement.67  The profit split method is mostly 
applicable to transactions that are so unified that it would be impossible to 
examine them independently.68 
 
There are two approaches to determining an arm’s length transfer 
price under this method and they are as follows: 
 
a). Residual Profit Split Analysis 
This approach involves two stages.  Firstly, each enterprise is 
allocated a basic return that is determined with reference to 
comparable transactions, in terms of functions and risks, of 
independent enterprises. The second stage involves the allocation of 
the remaining residual profit amongst the enterprises in a manner that 
would have been adopted by independent enterprises.  Contributions 
by the enterprises to the residual profit are often subjectively 
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measured due to the lack of an external benchmark when the 
transactions entered into between the enterprises are unique.69  This 
may cause the reliability of this method to determine an arm’s length 
price to be questioned.70 
  
b). Contribution Analysis 
This approach is useful when the transaction is between large 
integrated multinationals that operate under economies of scale.  The 
reason being is that independent enterprises are not always able to 
save costs the way large integrated multinationals can and therefore it 
may be difficult for such multinationals to find an uncontrolled 
comparable transaction in order to determine a reliable arm’s length 
transfer price.71 
 
The combined operating profit of the two enterprises is divided 
amongst the enterprises with reference to the value of the functions 





The Australian Taxation Ruling 97/20 provides guidelines on the 
application of the ALP for cross-border transactions between independent 
parties with reference to division 13 of the Income Tax Act 1936.  When 
determining a range of arm’s length prices, the Australian Taxation Office 
(ATO) seems to favour the use of comparable uncontrolled transactions as 
para 2.84 of TR 97/20 states the following: 
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‘The arm’s-length range is constructed using only comparable uncontrolled 
dealings that have, or have been adjusted to, a high level of reliability in 
comparison with the controlled dealings’.73 
 
However, the ATO will allow controlled data to be used as 
corroborating evidence, based on para 2.90 of TR 97/20, which states ‘In the 
absence of comparable uncontrolled dealings, it may be possible to infer 
from other industry available information whether dealings between the 
associated enterprises achieve an arm’s length outcome.  However, it should 
be noted that data that does not achieve a high level of reliability cannot be 
used in constructing an arm’s-length range and, while it may be useful in 
terms of broad indications, cannot be given the same status in determining 
an arm’s length outcome’.  According to the ruling though, such information 
can still be useful in determining an arm’s length range of prices when it is 
combined with other information.74 
 
The arm’s length transfer pricing methods acknowledged by TR 97/20 
are: 
• the traditional transaction methods, namely the CUP method, RP 
method and CP method; and 
• the transactional profit methods, namely the TNMM and Profit Split 
method 
 
TR 97/20 does not provide an order of preference with regards to the 
selection of a method, as long as the method chosen results in the most 
reliable range of arm’s length prices.75 
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3.5 UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Schedule 28AA Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 contains the 
UK transfer pricing legislation which requires the application of the ALP for 
connected party transactions.76  The UK tax legislation incorporates the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and gives preference to traditional 
transaction methods rather than transactional profit methods.77 
 
The Inland Revenue emphasizes the importance of comparability 
when companies make use of benchmarking to determine an arm’s length 
price, with the most important comparables being the functions performed 
and the size of the parties in relation to one another.  In practice, the Inland 
Revenue will not accept companies that form part of a group as 
comparables, unless the group is wholly based in the UK and that any intra-
group transactions, should they exist, can be eliminated.78 
 
In circumstances where it is not possible to determine a comparable 
uncontrolled price, the Inland Revenue will look to the ‘cost-plus’ or ‘resale 
price’ methods, depending on the facts of the case at hand.  In situations 
where sufficient reliable information is absent, resulting in the standard 
OECD pricing methodologies not being applicable, the Inland Revenue is 
willing to make use of  ‘gross profit comparisons drawn from applicable 
industry-wide data’ to establish an arm’s length price.79 
 
The Inland Revenue has stated that their objective is ‘…to ensure that 
the UK taxpayer is paying the proper UK tax on its profits under the law’.  To 
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achieve this, they ‘…will in practice use any method which seems likely to 




Transfer pricing is dealt with under section 247 of the Canadian 
Income Tax Act (“ITA”), which is administered by the Canada Revenue 
Agency (“CRA”).81  There are no rules and regulations in the ITA but 
administrative practices can be found in Information Circular 87-2R 
(September 27, 1999).82  ‘Reasonable efforts’ are required to be made by 
taxpayers in ensuring that non-arm’s length transactions with non-residents 
are concluded at arm’s length.83 
 
The CRA utilises the transfer pricing methods contained in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines as no methods are prescribed in the ITA.  The 
CRA believes that the methods have a ‘natural’ hierarchy, with the traditional 
transaction methods taking preference over the transactional profit 
methods.84 
 
In the CRA APA Program Report 2003-2004 statistics showed that 
more than 60% of the completed and in-progress APAs since the start of the 
program used the Profit Split and the TNMM transfer pricing methods, while 
only 17% made use of the CUP method.  In addition, the CRA prefers the 
Profit Split method to the TNMM when there is a lack of reliable comparable 
transactions as it considers the arm’s length result of the Profit Split method 
to be more accurate.85 
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With regards to controversial transfer pricing practices, the approaches 
taken by the CRA include the use of: 
• single year data; 
• fewer comparables as opposed to more; and 




All the countries under review have adopted the ALP and follow the 
transfer pricing methods contained in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  
None of the countries examined are prescribed a hierarchy with regards to 
the selection of a suitable transfer pricing method, but preference in all the 
countries is given to traditional transaction methods, and more specifically 
the CUP method. 
 
The most appropriate transfer pricing method to produce a reasonable 
estimate of an arm’s length outcome will depend on the availability of reliable 
data and the extent of adjustments required to be made to ensure 
comparability. 
 
In the Ernst and Young 2005-2006 Global Transfer Pricing Surveys,87 
the transfer pricing methods used by the respondents were found to be as 
follows: 
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CUP 30% 17% 






Resale Price 17% - - - - 
Cost - 17% - 31% - 
Cost Plus 26% 57% - 50% - 
Profit Split 4% - 8% - 8% 
Profits-Based 16% - 12% - 15% 
Other/not stated 7% 8% 25% 19% 21% 
Overall profits-based methods are increasingly used by tax authorities to test tangibles 
transactions whereas a minority of respondents use this approach. 
Table 3.1  
Methods used by transaction type (Parents)  
 
The survey indicates that the CUP method is the most commonly used 
method for transactions involving tangible goods, and is also the method that 
the OECD views as being the most direct way of determining an arm’s length 
price.88 
 
In practice however, because South Africa’s economy is relatively 
small, the application of traditional transaction methods may be difficult due 
to a lack of sufficient reliable comparables.  Under such circumstances, the 
transactional profit methods may be the only option.89 
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CHAPTER 4: POLICY DOCUMENTATION AND 




The introduction by SARS, in 2004, of new transfer pricing policy 
disclosure requirements were much needed compliance guidelines for 
companies, who were in the dark regarding this issue since 1995, when 
transfer pricing legislation came into effect in South Africa.90  Prior to the 
introduction of the new disclosure requirements, companies of all sizes, 
involved in cross-border intra-company transactions, could get away with 
ticking a box on their annual corporate tax returns to inform SARS that they 
have policy documentation.91 
 
4.2 DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 
 
With the new disclosure requirements it is compulsory for companies 
engaged in international activity with related companies to submit their 
transfer pricing policy documentation to SARS on completion of their annual 
corporate tax returns.92 
 
Practice Note No 7, issued by SARS in 1999, provides guidelines on 
the preparation of documentation, which is broadly based on Chapter 5 of the 
OECD Guidelines.93  The Practice Note openly admits that ‘there is no explicit 
statutory requirement to prepare and maintain transfer pricing documentation’ 
but it goes on to express the importance of having sufficient documentation, 
which will be discussed further on.94  Because section 31 of the Act does not 
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incorporate transfer pricing documentation, the only legislation giving SARS 
access to a company’s transfer pricing information and documentation are 
sections 74, 74A, 74B, 74C, 74D and 75 of the Act, and section 69 of the Act 
may also be used to assist the Commissioner.95 
 
SARS issued an addendum to its practice note on 29 September 2005 
to help clear the confusion amongst taxpayers regarding the need for 
companies to have a transfer pricing policy document or not.  The addendum 
confirms that it is not a statutory requirement for taxpayers to prepare 
transfer pricing policy documentation, but that it is advisable for them to do so 
in order to minimise the risks associated with a lack of documentation.96  
Although taxpayers are not required by law to prepare policy documentation, 
they are under obligation to submit such documentation to SARS, with the 
annual tax return, should they indicate in the tax return that such 
documentation exists.97  If SARS requests for information from a taxpayer, the 
request must be responded to within 30 days.98 
 
4.3 NON-COMPLIANCE PENALTIES 
 
The information brochure that accompanies the IT14 tax return states 
the following:  
 
It is incumbent upon the taxpayer that an accurate and full disclosure 
of all required and relevant information is made in the income tax 
return.  In addition to possible prosecution and the imposition of 
penalties prescribed by the Income Tax Act for misrepresentation, 
neglect or omission to furnish or furnishing false information, additional 
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assessments (together with interest), may be raised after the expiry 
date of three years from the date of assessment.99 
 
In South Africa, a taxpayer could be penalised in terms of s 75 for 
failing to submit any documentation as required in terms of the Act or as 
requested by the Commissioner.  Transfer pricing policy documentation 
would be included in ‘any documentation’.100 
 
Section 76 involves the imposition of additional tax, equal to double the 
tax chargeable, in respect of the following situations: 
• if a taxpayer fails to submit a tax return (s 76(1)(a)).  This section 
could be applicable if a transfer pricing policy document is not 
furnished with the annual tax return rendering an incomplete 
submission of the tax return. 
• if a taxpayer makes an incorrect statement in a tax return (s 76(1)(c)).  
Subsections (a) and (c) could be applicable if an incorrect statement is 
made relating to transfer pricing. 
 
Section 76(1)(b) applies when a taxpayer omits income in his return that 
ought to have been included.  However, s 31(2) does not prescribe that 
cross-border transactions between related parties must be concluded at 
arm’s length.  Therefore, a taxpayer can never be held to have omitted an 
amount ‘which ought to have been included’ in a tax return, as is stated in s 
76(1)(b).101 
 
In terms of proviso (i) to section 79(1) of the Act, the Commissioner can 
raise an additional assessment if the following requirements are met: 
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(a) there had been a non-disclosure of material facts or fraud or      
misrepresentation by the taxpayer, and 
(b) the non-assessment of the amount in question was causally 
related to the non-disclosure of material facts or fraud or 
misrepresentation 
 
The court in terms of the case of SIR v Trow held this.102  SARS can therefore 
charge companies additional tax at 29 per cent, STC at 12,5 per cent, 
interest and up to 200 per cent penalties on adjustments made to cross-
border transactions as far back as the Nineties, resulting in massive financial 
implications for the companies concerned.103 
 
Under section 76(2)(a), however, the Commissioner has the discretion 
to remit the additional charge imposed under section 76(1), unless the 
taxpayer’s intention was to evade tax.104 
 
4.4 THE NEED FOR DOCUMENTATION 
 
The practice note provides a number of reasons on why it is advisable 
to prepare adequate transfer pricing documentation.  The most obvious 
reason being that the Commissioner’s attention is going to be drawn to a 
taxpayer’s transfer pricing whose documentation is poorly prepared over a 
taxpayer’s that has been adequately prepared.  The Commissioner’s 
investigation of a taxpayer’s policy documentation could then lead to the 
taxpayer’s arm’s length amount being replaced by one that the 
Commissioner feels is more suitable, and the taxpayer will be in an 
unfavourable position to rebut the Commissioner’s decision based on the fact 
that inadequate documentation was prepared.105  As already stated above, 
taxpayers are required to furnish transfer pricing information with the annual 
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tax return for companies (IT14), and if no documentation has been prepared 




4.5.1 Documentation Requirements 
 
The contemporaneous documentation that is required to be 
maintained is detailed in Taxation Ruling TR 98/11.  In order to prove that the 
ALP has been complied with, the documentation should show that the 4 step 
process, as provided by the ATO in TR 98/11, has been followed.  This 4 
step process, involving the setting and reviewing of transfer prices, is not 
compulsory but will be beneficial to the taxpayer.  The 4 steps are as follows: 
 
Step 1: Accurately characterise the international dealings 
between the associated enterprises in the context of the 
taxpayer’s business and document that characterisation; 
Step 2: Select the most appropriate transfer pricing methodology 
or methodologies and document the choice; 
Step 3: Apply the most appropriate method, determine the arm’s 
length outcome and document the process; and 
Step 4: Implement support processes.  Install review process to 
ensure adjustment for material changes and document 
these processes.107 
 
Even though there is no deadline for preparing transfer pricing 
documentation, it is expected to be prepared before submission of the annual 
tax return so that it can be noted on Schedule 25A that such documentation 
is available.  The documentation is not submitted unless the ATO sends out a 
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specific notification requesting it to be, and this should be done within the two 




Penalties relating to transfer pricing adjustments are covered in Section 
225 of the Income Tax Act 1936 and Division 284 of the Tax Administration 
Act 1953, and they are as follows: 
• Transfer pricing agreements entered into where sole or main purpose 
was to pay no or less tax → 50% of the tax avoided 
If taxpayer has a reasonably arguable position → reduction to 25% 
• Other transfer pricing agreements entered into where tax was avoided 
→ 25% of tax avoided 
If taxpayer has a reasonably arguable position → reduction to 10%  
The Commissioner can however use his discretionary power to reduce the 
penalties to zero.109 
 
The relevant taxation rulings are TR 98/11 and TR 98/16 and they 
indicate that the above penalties can be avoided if taxpayers satisfactorily 
complete the 4 step process in setting and reviewing transfer prices and that 
they prepare contemporaneous documentation to substantiate the arm’s 
length conditions arrived at.110  APAs also protect taxpayers from incurring 
penalties, unless the transactions or agreements entered into do not satisfy 
the terms and conditions of the APA.111 
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4.6 UNITED KINGDOM 
 
4.6.1  Documentation Requirements 
 
The taxpayer is required to have prepared transfer pricing 
documentation by the time the annual tax return must be filed.  It is not 
compulsory though to submit the documentation together with the annual tax 
return, but rather when the UK Tax Authorities ask to see it.112 
 
The Inland Revenue, with regards to the availability of transfer pricing 
records, has provided the following guidance: 
• transactions should be accounted for as they take place 
• records of tax adjustments and transactions with connected parties 
need only be performed on filing of the tax return 
• proof to show that an arm’s length price has been arrived at need not 
be prepared unless requested by the Tax Authorities113 
 
However, such guidance may not be useful in practice due to the 
following reasons: 
• Transfer pricing adjustments to ensure the price is at arm’s length 
should be done before a company’s books are closed for the year as 
adjustments to a tax return, in some countries, do not allow for 
alterations to both sides of a transaction when the transfer pricing 
adjustment is downwards, resulting in double taxation.  
• Transfer pricing adjustments done in a tax return are more likely to 
result in an audit.114 
                                               
112
  BKR International ‘BKR Transfer Pricing Survey: Transfer Pricing and Documentation’ at 
16. Available at http://www.lohncaulder.com/docs/library/154.pdf [Accessed 3 January 2007]. 
113
  Sean Foley and Andrew Hickman ‘Meeting the “contemporaneous” requirement’ at 17. 
Available at 
http://www.kpmgtaxwatch.com/pub/intl/TransferPricingGuide_2005_(7thEdition).pdf 





4.6.2  Penalties 
  
Should documentation not be available when requested by the Tax 
Authorities, paragraph 23 of schedule 18 of the Finance Act 1998 imposes a 
fixed penalty not exceeding £3000.115  Where the transfer pricing has to be 
adjusted, as the result of a fraudulent or negligent tax return being submitted, 
additional penalties of up to 100% of the tax lost will also be imposed on the 
taxpayer under Section 95/96 of Taxes Management Act of 1970 and 
Paragraph 20 Schedule 18 Finance Act of 1988.116  Interest will also be levied 
on the additional tax payable by the taxpayer due to the transfer pricing 
adjustment.117 
 
Documenting transfer pricing policies may protect taxpayers from 
neglect penalties, as the documentation will serve as proof of the application 
of the ALP.  Any reduction in penalties will be made after taking into account 




4.7.1  Documentation Requirements 
 
Regulations issued by the CRA state that the deadline for the 
preparation of contemporaneous documentation is by the filing date of annual 
tax returns, which is six months after year-end.  Any documentation 
submitted after year-end will not be seen as contemporaneous and will be 
subject to transfer pricing penalties.119 
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To avoid the imposition of penalties, taxpayers need to show that they 
have made concerted efforts to arrive at an arm’s length transfer price.  
According to section 247(4) of the Canada ITA, this can be achieved by 
preparing contemporaneous documentation that includes a description of the 
following: 
 
(1) the actual transaction, 
(2) the terms and the conditions of the transaction and its related 
transactions, 
(3) the participants involved and how they are related to each other, 
(4) the information available and transfer pricing methods looked at to 
arrive at the arm’s length transfer price used 
(5) the business reasons for the transfer price chosen120 
 
4.7.2  Penalties 
 
In terms of subsection 247(3) of the ITA, a transfer pricing adjustment 
is subject to a penalty of 10%, provided the adjustment is positive.  In other 
words, a penalty may only be imposed on a taxpayer where the transfer 
pricing adjustment has resulted in an increase in the taxpayer’s income or a 
decrease in the taxpayer’s loss.121  Before a penalty is imposed the Transfer 
Pricing Review Committee reviews it, and up to March 2006 the Committee 
has suggested penalties for about half the cases that it has reviewed.122 
 
The following situations can lead to the elimination of transfer pricing 
penalties: 
• The net transfer pricing adjustments do not exceed the lesser of: 10% 
of the taxpayer’s gross revenue or C$ 5 million, or 
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• The taxpayer made “reasonable efforts” to conclude an arm’s length 
result by preparing contemporaneous documentation, either within six 
months following its taxation year end, or within three months of the 
CRA’s request.123 
 
4.8  SURVEY ON TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION             
        PRACTICES 
 
In Ernst & Young’s 2005-2006 Transfer Pricing Surveys, compliance 
demands was highlighted as one of the major driving forces behind the 
increase in the importance of transfer pricing.124 
 
Even though transfer pricing documentation serves as a guard against 
a transfer pricing audit, many of the 348 parent companies interviewed did 
not approach transfer pricing documentation seriously.  Numerous countries 
require transfer pricing documentation to be prepared by the filing date of the 
annual return, yet less than fifty percent of the companies interviewed stated 
that they do so.   Almost one third of the respondents mentioned that they 
only prepare documentation on a country-by-country basis when the need to 
do so arises, resulting in some of these respondents only preparing 
documentation when they have been selected for an audit.  The risk of these 
countries incurring transfer pricing penalties due to transfer pricing 
adjustments is large.125 
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Prepared for a single country and
modified to meet the needs of other 
jurisdictions as necessary
Prepared concurrently, on a globally
coordinated basis
Prepared on an as-necessary, country-
by-country basis with limited
coordination between countries





Approach to Transfer Pricing Documentation (Parent Companies) 
 
When asked the reasons for preparing transfer pricing documentation, 
18% of the parent company respondents indicate that it is to defend 
themselves in an audit and 24% use it to reduce risk.  Only 9% see preparing 




















Why MNEs Prepare TP Documentation 
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With the increasing interest in transfer pricing in South Africa, it is 
advisable for companies engaged in cross-border transactions to start 
preparing contemporaneous documentation now, especially because of the 
backdating that may take place should the Commissioner find that the 
taxpayer is guilty of non-disclosure of material facts, fraud or 
misrepresentation.  In a jurisdiction where the onus is on the taxpayer, 
preparing adequate documentation may serve as a vital defence against 
transfer pricing investigations by SARS in illustrating compliance with the 
ALP.  As will be discussed further on, the other countries under review may 
make use of APAs to protect themselves from incurring transfer pricing 
penalties.  However, this option is not yet available to South Africa, making 
the preparation of contemporaneous documentation even more important to 
South Africa than the other countries. 
 
Because it is not a statutory requirement to prepare documentation, it 
is difficult for taxpayers to be certain that they are meeting statutory 
requirements with regards to preventing the incurrence of penalties as a 
result of non-compliance with the ALP.  Following the guidelines contained in 
SARS’ Practice Note No 7 may not always serve as a preventative measure 
against non-compliance penalties if the taxpayer has construed the 
guidelines to mean something different to that of SARS. 
 
South Africa is the only country under review that does not have 
specific provisions relating to transfer pricing penalties, but rather general 
penalty rules applicable in terms of the Act.  However, these general penalty 
rules provide the same purpose and the Commissioner has the discretion to 
remit penalties imposed in the same way the other countries can use specific 






The disadvantages to preparing transfer pricing documentation include 
the fact that it is time consuming and costly, but with SARS seeing transfer 
pricing as a potentially ‘lucrative area’,127 the tax risk of not preparing such 
documentation could be even higher. 
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The OECD defines an APA as follows:  
 
An advance pricing agreement (‘APA’) is an arrangement that 
determines, in advance of controlled transactions, an appropriate set 
of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments 
thereto, and critical assumptions as to future events) for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed 
period of time.  An APA is formally initiated by a taxpayer and requires 
negotiations between the taxpayer, one or more associated 
enterprises, and one or more tax administrations.128 
 
APAs between two countries (bilateral) or between multiple countries 
(multilateral) are preferable as they aid in the prevention of double taxation, a 
primary risk associated with transfer pricing.129 
 
Unfortunately, South Africa has not been granted the option of 
agreeing in advance to an acceptable range of pricing with the revenue 
authorities.130  This is made clear in para 16.2 of the SARS’ Practice Note No 
7, which states that ‘the APA process will not in the foreseeable future be 
made available to South African taxpayers’.  SARS does not give the reasons 
why. 
 
5.2 CERTAINTY IN LAW 
 
‘…the subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under 
the protection of the state.’ In order for this to be achieved, taxpayers need to 
know with certainty the time, manner and amount to be contributed.  This 
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allows taxpayers to predict the tax consequences of transactions in advance, 
resulting in effective tax planning and budgeting.  Certainty can be achieved 
through the implementation of legal rules.  Transfer pricing in South Africa is 
lacking in certainty, as the application of the Practice Note issued by SARS, 
providing the working of available transfer pricing methods, does not always 
result in an arm’s length condition being achieved by the taxpayer.  To 
ensure certainty of arriving at an arm’s length price, other countries have 
adopted the use of APAs.131 
 
In the case of R v Jopp,132 the court held that the person bound by the 
by-law or regulation must know with reasonable certainty what act is 
permitted, or what act is enjoined or prohibited so that the person may 
conduct his affairs accordingly.  If certainty exists, the by-law or regulation is 
valid.  If there is uncertainty, the by-law or regulation is invalid.133 
 
In R v Rousseau,134 the principle from R v Jopp 135 was applied.  The 
court held that the by-law or regulation affecting the person must provide 
guidance such that the person is able to avoid contravening it.136 
 
5.3 ADVANTAGES OF USING APAs 
 
The upholding of the principle of tax certainty is necessary so that 
taxpayers can know in advance the tax consequences of any given 
transaction.  One of the means of ensuring transfer pricing certainty, and 
preventing the incurrence of penalties for non-compliance with the 
requirements of the relevant tax authority, is the use of APAs.137 
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Besides bringing certainty, APAs can help to avoid the extensive 
audits, queries and controversies resulting in costly transfer pricing disputes, 
by arriving at arm’s length prices before the conclusion of any transactions.138   
 
As mentioned above, the use of an APA eliminates the need to 
conduct a long, drawn out audit.  This has resulted in an increase in the 
number of countries choosing in favour of offering APAs as tax authorities 
can then devote more time and utilise scarce resources in other tax 
administrative areas.139 
 
Other advantages of using APAs include the reduction or elimination 
of double taxation, providing an alternative solution to allocating profits to the 
correct tax jurisdictions without being taxed twice, and minimising the volume 
of record keeping as APAs will allow you to know in advance what 
substantiating records are required to be kept.140 
 
5.4 CRITICISMS AGAINST THE USE OF APAs 
 
If the issues involved are difficult and the interests of the participants 
vary, the APA negotiations may lead to quarrelsome situations.  APAs have 
also not been regarded as being helpful in resolving difficult issues, such as 
those involving high value intangibles, but should rather be used for more 
straightforward issues, such as those involving tangible property, services 
and routine intangibles.141 
 
Because APAs are not statutory in nature, they cannot be legally 
objected to.  When APAs are negotiated in private it may result in 
subsequent parties being negatively affected due to the fact that they had no 
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say in the agreements concluded.  The agreements concluded may also be 
more influenced by tax considerations than business reasons if getting an 
APA results in a greater advantage overall.142 
 
Another criticism against APAs is that the period they are entered into 
is fixed, and if this period is too long the taxpayer’s flexibility in making sound 
business decisions may be negatively affected.143  The adoption of APAs is 
also not being done at a rapid pace due to the requirement of the 
employment of specialised professionals that are costly and difficult to retain, 
creating an additional disincentive to the APA process.144 
 
For companies with “skeletons in the cupboard”, the use of APAs may 
not necessarily be beneficial.  Because of the extensive amount of 
information required to be included in an APA, it may result in transfer pricing 
information being uncovered that would not have been picked up in an audit.  
This information can also be used for auditing/litigation purposes in prior 
years not covered by the APA.145 
 
There is also the possibility of an APA application being refused by the 
tax authorities, or they may, at any time, withdraw from the process due to a 
number of reasons.  This means that taxpayers may incur APA application 
preparation expenses with no guarantee of securing an APA.146 
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5.5 THE APA PROGRAM IN AUSTRALIA 
 
The ATO encourages taxpayers to use APAs and more specifically 
bilateral APAs.  Guidance on APAs and the process surrounding them can 
be found in the Taxation Ruling TR 95/23 and the ATO has also written a 
guide on Australia’s APA program.147 
 
In Australia APAs are available to any enterprise engaged in cross-
border connected party transactions and agreements as long as such 
transactions or agreements covered by the APA are not immaterial, 
hypothetical or involving unacceptable transfer pricing methods that do not 
result in an arm’s length price range being achieved.148 
 
There is no set layout for an APA application; however the application 
must contain stipulations for the use of the transfer pricing methodology.  The 
APAs are generally negotiated in such a manner that besides providing 
certainty for the taxpayer, they also provide results that are realistic, avoiding 
the possibility of unpleasant audit situations.149 
 
Advantages to having an APA in Australia include providing assurance 
to the taxpayer against an adjustment to the transfer pricing methodology 
selected, assisting in resolving issues that may have arisen in previous 
periods and the option of renewal before expiration of the initial term.  
Disadvantages, on the other hand, include the considerable cost of collecting 
information and the lengthy process of twelve months before the 
approval/refusal of an application.150 
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5.6 THE APA PROGRAM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Legislation on APAs was introduced in the UK in 1999 in section 85-87 
of the Finance Act, and guidelines on the application of these sections are 
contained in a Statement of Practice released in September 1999.  In order 
for an application for an APA to be granted, it needs to be established that 
the transfer pricing issues to be dealt with in the APA are so complex that it 
will impact compliance with the ALP.151 
 
Applications for both unilateral and bilateral APAs will be considered, 
however bilateral APAs are encouraged over unilateral APAs.  This is due to 
the fact that bilateral APAs result in tax administrations of both countries 
agreeing to the method selected for dealing with the transfer pricing issues 
covered in the APA.152  An APA will last a minimum period of 3 years and a 
maximum period of five years and will normally apply prospectively.  In 
certain circumstances though, where the facts surrounding prior periods are 
considerably similar, special provisions can be made to roll back the APA 
methodology.153  There are also provisions in place for an APA to be 
renewed, unless the issues stay the same, which in that case the APA can 
just be amended and extended.  A disincentive to the APA process is the 
time factor, with the UK taking 18 – 21 months from the receipt of an 
application.154   
 
Should a taxpayer, at any time, be guilty of misrepresentation or 
omission of facts resulting in the APA reflecting non-arm’s length conditions, 
or there has been a lack of compliance by the taxpayer with a provision 
contained in the agreement, the tax authorities may revoke the APA.  
Furthermore, a taxpayer cannot appeal against a revocation but can only 
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appeal against the assessments issued subsequent to the revocation.  APAs 
do not provide protection against transfer pricing penalties for tax evasion in 
a tax return as a result of fraudulence, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of 
material facts.  False or misleading information in an APA application will also 
attract penalties.155  
 
5.7 THE APA PROGRAM IN CANADA 
 
The Canadian APA program has been in operation since 1993 with APAs 
being available under Information Circular 94-4R (March 2001).156  There is 
no statutory provision relating to APAs, however, the Competent Authority 
Services Division (CASD), which is responsible for the Canadian APA 
program, considers APAs to be its ‘preferred transfer pricing dispute 
resolution program’.157  The CRA’s purpose for the APA program is to: 
• eliminate the possibility of double taxation; 
• allow taxpayers to determine acceptable transfer pricing 
methodologies for non-arm’s length transactions with non-residents for 
purposes of the ITA; and 
• assist in the resolution of transfer pricing disputes.158 
 
Although unilateral, bilateral and multilateral APAs are available to 
taxpayers, the CRA prefers bilateral and multilateral APAs as unilateral APAs 
cannot prevent double taxation.159  Bilateral and multilateral APAs also 
provide the benefit of certainty with regards to the treatment of the transfer 
pricing issues in all the countries concerned.160 
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The CASD does not levy a fee for APAs, but should an APA application 
be accepted or an APA renewed, a non-refundable fee is charged for ‘out-of-
pocket’ costs, which could include, for example, the cost of travelling and 
accommodation of the team conducting the application process.161 
 
The APA program, however, also includes many unappealing aspects, 
such as the following: 
• the approval process is lengthy and expensive; 
• the cost of providing detailed information to the fiscal authorities can 
outweigh the benefits that result.  The costs include ‘sensitive 
commercial pricing and strategic information’ being disclosed by the 
fiscal authorities through industry databases, and the use of APA 
information in subsequent audits. 
• There is no guarantee that the Canadian government will accept a 





All three countries reviewed above follow an APA program with the 
United Kingdom being the only country with APA statutory provisions though.  
Preference lies with bilateral and multilateral APAs, which assist in the 
avoidance of potential double taxation and provide certainty with regards to 
the agreement of transfer pricing methods to be used by the countries 
involved in the cross-border transactions. 
 
Although the APA application process is time-consuming and costly, 
the benefit of tax certainty, which assists in the prevention of non-compliance 
penalties and costly transfer pricing disputes, outweighs the cost advantage.  
South Africa should therefore consider allowing taxpayers to apply for APAs 
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in respect of transfer pricing as an alternative to contemporaneous 
documentation that may not assist in a transfer pricing dispute anyway. 
 
As mentioned above, there are also many downsides to APAs.  For this 
reason, South Africa should modify/simplify aspects of the APA programs 
followed in other countries when deciding on a suitable program.  The 
following changes could be implemented: 
• The APA period could be shorter than the minimum period of three 
years as per other countries to allow for flexibility in the making of 
business decisions 
• The expense involved in the application process should be reduced for 
small to medium sized multinationals so that they are not 
disadvantaged 
• Guidelines should be issued by authorities that help minimise the 
possibility of a refusal of an APA so that unnecessary preparation 
expenditure is not incurred163 
• The APAs should initially be limited to resolving straightforward issues 
to avoid unpleasant negotiation situations 
 
The advantage to South Africa of introducing an APA program after other 
countries is that South Africa can learn from their experiences without having 
to incur the same costs and time.  An APA program in South Africa would 
also encourage foreign investment and promote economic growth, as 
foreigners, with subsidiaries or branches in South Africa, would be more 
attracted to invest in a country where they know transfer pricing disputes will 
be resolved easily.164 
 
The lack of specialised professionals and the cost of retaining them may 
pose a problem to South Africa.  However, with transfer pricing being the 
dominant tax issue facing MNEs, according to Ernst & Young’s 2005-2006 
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Global Transfer Pricing Surveys, the cost of employing specialised 
professionals in APAs may be less than those incurred resolving transfer 
pricing disputes as a result of no APA program being available to taxpayers 









Everything that was comfortable and familiar about business is 
changing.  We’re at the beginning of an age that will complete the 
relentless act of connecting everything to everything else.  This 
networked economy – decentralised and anti-hierarchical – will be the 
most important force shaping the next decade, and will change the 
world’s societies, culture, and politics.  But first it will radically 
transform business, altering the way they reach their customers, 
advertise their wares, distribute their products, create new businesses, 
and communicate with one another and their staffs.165 
 
Because of the increased use of the Internet and electronic commerce 
(“e-commerce”) as a way of doing business, tax authorities will have to 
review their present legislation and practices to protect their respective tax 
basis.166  One of the crucial challenges that e-commerce has created is that of 
being able to apply the ALP to transfer pricing when trade takes place 
between multinational corporations in different tax jurisdictions.167  In the 
discussion paper, prepared by the Fiscal Affairs Committee, for the OECD 
Ottawa Conference on electronic commerce, it was mentioned that e-
commerce has not resulted in the introduction of new problems for transfer 
pricing, but instead has made them more common.  The lack of physical 
boundaries makes it extremely difficult to identify, trace, quantify and verify 
cross-border transactions.168 
 
                                               
165
  J Daly cited in Richardson op cit note 5. 
166
  Bernard du Plessis and Michelle Viljoen ‘Taxation of e-commerce: income tax.’ Available 
at http://www.buys.co.za/publications/cyberlaw/cybertext/chapter8.htm [Accessed 21 
December 2006].  
167
  Annet Wanyana Oguttu ‘Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance: Is the Arm’s length 
Principle Still Relevant in the e-Commerce Era?’ (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 138 at 138-139.  
168
  Jonathan S Schwarz ‘Transfer Pricing and Electronic Commerce.’ Available at 





6.2  POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES AND EFFECTS OF E-
COMMERCE 
 
6.2.1  Goods and Services 
 
In traditional commerce, the open market value of goods and services 
is generally determined with reference to the various characteristics 
displayed.  With respect to goods, this could include quality and reliability, 
while services could include the nature and extent of the services.  Goods 
and services offered electronically, however, have been de-materialised as a 
result of being supplied in a digital form, thus causing the comparability of 
transactions to be affected.  One such comparable factor is that of durability.  
Music on a CD for example can be played many times, but if that music is 
digitised it can only be played subject to management by the supplier.  
Comparability with respect to prices is also impacted as digitised products 
may be easily copied.169 
 
Before the Commissioner can adjust a transfer price to reflect an 
arm’s length price, the provision in s 31(2) has to be met in that the goods or 
services must have been sold at a non-arm’s-length price.  In traditional 
commerce, transactions are generally easy to uncover by the trail of paper 
they leave behind, while prices charged for goods or services sold 
electronically are difficult to determine due to payment being made with 
electronic money or digital cash.  These forms of payment make it relatively 
easy for multinational corporations to carry out transfer pricing 
transactions.170 
 
The functions performed by each company must be compared before 
the prices of controlled and uncontrolled transactions can be compared.171  
This comparison must be determined with reference to the important 
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activities and responsibilities undertaken or to be undertaken.172  To perform a 
functional analysis, a close understanding of the business functions is 
required to determine the relative contributions made.  In e-commerce 
transactions this is difficult to measure.  For example, when an intangible is 
delivered on a web page the functions being performed could be any of the 
following: an advertisement, subject to a copyright, or a provision of 
services.173 
 
Physical services such as consulting are also available electronically 
through video conferencing and electronic messaging for example.  Because 
physical consultants are generally very expensive, multinational corporations 
are more likely going to seek on-line services at lower costs from distant 
locations than expensive services offered locally.174 
 
6.2.2 Identification of Connected Parties 
 
In terms of s 31(2) of the Act, the price that goods or services are sold 
can only be said to be non-arm’s length if the two parties concerned are 
‘connected’. 
 
At present it is difficult to determine who the physical parties are 
behind Internet transactions as the only information that can be gathered 
from an Internet address is who is responsible for the upkeep of that name.  
It does not give you the users of that address or the location of the computer.  
Owners of web sites can also not be detected as usage of Internet sites does 
not leave a trail, owners can conceal the existence or location of their 
websites by using intricate networks or false names, they can use offshore 
servers to prevent monitoring of their sites and where monitoring is not 
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avoidable, encryption may be used to prevent the nature and value of their 
Internet transactions from being revealed.175 
 
The following views were expressed by the ATO regarding this issue: 
 
A key issue will be the extent to which the Internet will allow business 
activities to be undetectable or anonymous, so that the key taxing and 
auditing requirements of the existence and identity of persons or 
transactions cannot be determined.  A high level of non-detection 
could lead to tax evasion in a highly competitive global business 
environment where businesses may be forced to adopt non-
compliance facilities to compete with other businesses, thus 
exacerbating non-compliance.  The migration of businesses to the 
Internet may be partially driven by the tax avoidance and evasion 
opportunities it presents.176 
 
6.2.3  Methods Used to Arrive at an Arm’s Length Price 
 
Following the Transfer Pricing Guidelines of the OECD, there must be 
a comparable uncontrolled transaction to be able to apply the traditional 
transaction methods so as to arrive at an arm’s length price.177  In traditional 
commerce, finding comparable uncontrolled transactions is often difficult as 
multinational enterprises are frequently integrated to attain economies of 
scale, and they trade in highly specialised goods and services.  Independent 
transactions carried out by two non-integrated enterprises trading in the 
same or similar goods or services are therefore not comparable to the 
measures achieved through integration.178 
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Finding comparable uncontrolled e-commerce transactions is even 
more difficult as it is hard to determine exactly what the transactions involve 
due to their uniqueness.  Separate transactions can also be so closely linked 
that it becomes impossible to evaluate them individually.  The traditional 
approach is also negatively impacted by the use of Intranets within 
multinational enterprises, as an analysis with independent transactions 
cannot be done.179 
 
Traditional transaction methods are usually given preference in 
determining an arm’s length price.  However, at the OECD Ottawa 
Conference on e-commerce in 1998, it was proposed that in certain 
situations the application of transaction profit methods, more specifically the 
Profit Split method, would be more suitable.  This is because in e-commerce 
the traditional transaction methods are unreliable due to a lack of comparable 
uncontrolled transactions or highly integrated business transactions.180 
 
6.3  CONCLUSION 
 
South Africa, along with many other countries, has adopted the ALP 
on a basis consistent with the OECD Guidelines, as this principle produces 
the most reliable outcome.  However, where transactions are not restricted to 
the geographical boundaries of a country, goods and services can be 
transferred between countries at a non-arm’s length price, in an effort to 
evade tax, without being detected. 
 
As mentioned by the ATO earlier in this chapter, if businesses 
succeed in evading tax through the use of e-commerce, it puts them at a 
competitive advantage, and other businesses will therefore need to follow 
suit in order to stay in business.  To protect South Africa’s tax base, 
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taxpayers need to be provided with guidelines with regards to conducting 
trade electronically, and certainty as to the consequences of their actions. 
 
One of the reasons making it difficult to determine an arm’s length 
price is the inability to evaluate a comparable transaction when it is so closely 
linked to another transaction.  It may be useful for South Africa to consider 
the way in which the United Kingdom has defined a transaction in its transfer 
pricing legislation to include “a series of transactions” where separating 
transactions may not enable the assessment of the arm’s length 
conditions.181 
 
Because it has to first be established that goods or services were sold 
at a non-arm’s length price and between connected parties, before the 
Commissioner can adjust a transfer price to reflect an arm’s length price, it 
may be necessary to modify or add to the current s 31(2), to enable it to also 
apply to e-commerce transactions.  Section 31(2) could incorporate the 
provisions of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act No. 25 of 
2002, which would enable information pertaining to the cross-border supply 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
This study has addressed a number of important issues in respect of 
transfer pricing in South Africa, a topic that has come under the spotlight in 
recent years, as a result of globalisation leading to an increase in 
international trade.  A comparative examination was made between the 
approaches to transfer pricing adopted by South Africa to those adopted by 
Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada. 
 
The results of the research indicate that all the countries under review 
have accepted the ALP, endorsed and adopted by the OECD.  This principle 
is achieved through the use of the transfer pricing methods contained in the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, of which preference is given to the 
traditional transaction methods.  Although the ALP produces a sound 
outcome, South Africa’s lack of comparable uncontrolled transactions makes 
it difficult to apply, encouraging the use of foreign comparables, which leads 
to further complications such as the ability to make adjustments to enhance 
comparability.183  Comparable uncontrolled transactions are also difficult to 
find when trade is conducted electronically, and therefore in certain situations 
transaction profit methods will be more suitable. 
 
Findings with regards to documentation include the need for legal 
requirements that would provide taxpayers with certainty as to what would 
constitute adequate documentation for SARS, avoiding unnecessary time 
and money being spent.  The need for documentation is highlighted by the 
Ernst & Young 2005-2006 Global Transfer Pricing Surveys in which it states 
that: ‘…many countries plan to focus their attacks on transaction flows with 
lower tax jurisdictions.’184 
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Although South Africa is the only country under review without specific 
transfer pricing penalties, the general penalty provisions of the Act are 
effective in punishing taxpayers for not complying with the ALP, and are also 
discretionary as with specific transfer pricing penalties in other countries.  
According to Jacques van Rhyn, tax director of PricewaterhouseCooper, the 
transfer pricing area of taxation has globally become a major source of 
income for tax authorities and the accompanying penalties and interest are 
onerous.185  Taxpayers should prevent themselves from incurring interest, 
penalties and double taxation, as a result of transfer pricing adjustments to 
cross-border transactions entered into from July 1995, by retroactively 
applying the guidance issued by SARS in Practice Note No 7.  SARS will not 
accept ignorance as an excuse.186 
 
An additional finding of the research is that South Africa, unlike the 
other three countries reviewed, has not yet implemented an APA program, 
putting it at a great disadvantage with regards to legal certainty.  APAs would 
also provide certainty that foreign investors are looking for, which would in 
turn benefit South Africa’s economy.  South Africa falls into the category of 
countries referred to by the Ernst & Young 2005-2006 Global Transfer Pricing 
Surveys when it mentions that: ‘Hard hitting documentation and penalty 
regimes precede APA availability by some years.’187  Until an APA program is 
introduced in South Africa, preparing documentation is the best line of 
defense when it comes to transfer pricing investigations. 
 
The following findings from Ernst & Young’s investigation of various 
tax authorities sum up the key messages with regards to transfer pricing: 
 
… tax authorities are better prepared than ever before; they are better 
informed; and they are under more pressure to deliver revenue “gains” 
from anti-avoidance work.  Transfer pricing adjustments are going to 
become more contested and more frequent.  The environment will 
also become far more litigious.  Companies will need not just tax 
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technical expertise to counter theses trends, they will also need to 
carefully align their transfer pricing structures with the commercial and 
operational imperatives of their business.  And they will need to think 
globally in terms of policy, and locally in terms of documentation and 
defense.  Nothing less will do.188  
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